In defense of intuitions: a reply to Rolla.
Uma resposta a Rolla
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36592/opiniaofilosofica.v14.1140Keywords:
intuitions, epistemology, thought experiments, methodology, naturalismAbstract
Rolla (2021) argued that the practice of evaluating epistemological theories based on intuitions yielded by the consideration of some cases, like hypothetical scenarios with envatted brains, clairvoyants and epistemic guardian angels, is a mistake. A mistake that, once recognized, would make the problems and methods that occupy epistemology change significantly. In this paper, I hold that Rolla’s argument doesn’t stand up to scrutiny.
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